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IDENTITY AND CRISIS: THE CRITICAL RACE PROJECT AND
POSTMODERN POLITICAL THEORY

GIL Goar*

The arrival of the current post-Civil Rights, postcolonial, post-Cold
War era has presented movement activists and progressive scholars with
a unique set of challenges. Mobilizing constituencies within, let alone
across, identity, national, and class lines has proven difficult as 19 'hand
20' century forms of white supremacy, imperialism, and Fordist forms of
capitalism fade from view. Scholars of the (now older) New Left generation, as well as those of the poststructural and postcolonial Left have
responded to the changing circumstances with calls for fundamental
theoretical and strategic ground-clearing, in many cases suggesting
nothing short of a fundamental redefinition of the political. Progressive
legal scholarship necessarily processes the crisis' through its own longstanding ambivalence regarding law's relationship to politics. 2 Indeed, as
social conflict and systemic contradiction seem increasingly to be channeled and managed through expanding transnational and domestic legal
processes, the sphere of the political seems to shrink and itself fade from
view.3 While few progressive legal scholars doubt the political nature of
all law, a different concern is raised by the possibility that law increasingly functions as a colonizer of the political.

" Assistant Professor, DePaul University, International Studies Program. Thanks
to Sumi,
Quin, and Maia Cho.
1. See discussion infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text for a definition of the "political
crisis" as discussed in this paper.
2.

See generally MORTON HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-

1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992) (presenting the intellectual history of modern
American legal thought as fluctuating between several traditional polarities that draw their real
meaning from the underlying separation of law from politics); ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL
JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILLIATION

IN A POST-CIViL RIGHTS AMERICA

128-149 (1999)

(discussing critical race theory's "practical turn" that is based on an understanding of the real
limitations and potentials of using law and legal process in the pursuit of racial justice).
3. The anti-globalization Left offers an interesting case for understanding the limits of
movement politics in the current conjuncture. To date, this impressive movement has primarily
targeted the international legal and governmental institutions (WTO, World Bank, IMF, Global
Economic Forum, G-8) that structure globalization from above. The pressure the protest movement
creates is therefore likely to lead to legal reform through these institutions. It is as yet unclear how
effective anti-globalization can be as a movement that structures change "from below." For an
interesting analysis of the various responses to globalization, see generally Patrick Bond, Strategy
and Self-Activity in the GlobalJusticeMovements at
http://www.fpif.org/papers/gjm.body.htmil (representing a "Foreign Policy in Focus Discussion
Paper" that presents excerpts from a forthcoming book by the author describing the approaches of
various anti-globalization movements) (last visited Sept. 12, 2001).
817
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Briefly surveying the range of left-liberal scholarly responses in the
United States, we can discern three categories of prescriptions for what
progressive politics should look like under current conditions. Some
commentators, disaffected by Civil Rights-style race, gender or sexuality-based coalitional politics, attribute perceived social movement stagnation to the rise of "identity politics," to them, a form of politics that is
divisive and lacking in material focus. Instead, these writers envision a
kind of progressive populism that would circumvent identity politics and
emphasize common economic and quality-of-life concerns shared across
social groups and economic strata.5 Others combine a post-structural
aversion to politics based on essentialized group identities with a loss of
faith in the various meta-narratives of emancipation (socialism, feminism, color conscious anti-racism, and anti-colonial nationalism). Politics, from this perspective, should remain pluralistic, open-ended and
shifting, ever vigilant against reductive ideological claims regarding
fixed identities (sexual, racial, gender, national) and broad-scale emancipatory projects. 6 A third group that advocates a form of postmodern (neo)
pragmatism foregrounds the political potential inherent in the affective
forces of human compassion and the harmony-creating dynamics of procedural fairness, even in the face of the postmodern contingency of truth,
knowledge and justice claims. From this perspective,, too, politics remains provisional, and emphasis is placed on situational and local responses and necessarily shifting solidarities.7
Behind such substantive prescriptions for a defensible progressive
politics in the postmodern era are deeper theoretical problems regarding
the very possibility of political contestation, questions about whether
"the political" still even exists and in what form.' Disagreements regard4. I focus here only on post-Civil Rights and post-Labor models. Of course, the older forms
of race and class struggles remain the operative models for many, if not most politically active
individuals and groups on the Left. Various critical approaches to identity and law (Critical Race
Theory, LatCrit, postcolonial legal studies, Third World Approaches to International Law) that have
emerged recently have debated the issues and approaches mentioned here.
5.

See, e.g., TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS: WHY AMERICA IS
(blaming, in part, identity politics for the demise of a

WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS (1995)

common left-liberal politics).
6. See, e.g., E. San Juan, Post-Colonialism and the Question of Nation-State Violence, 78
DENy. U. L. REv. 889 (2001) (discussing and critiquing this approach). The LatCrit project has
incorporated certain elements from this category in its fundamental organizing philosophy, although
its very name implies a program based on the assertion of a collective (perhaps necessarily
"essentialized") racial grouping. See Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Theorizing 'OutCrit' Theories:
Coalitional Method and Comparative Jurisprudential Experience--RaceCrits, QueerCrits and
LatCrits,53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1265, 1278-1294 (1999) (discussing the coalitional model of LatCrit
and the "anti-essentialist essentialism" of LatCrit method).
7.

See generally RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY,

IRONY,

AND

SOLIDARITY

(1989)

(frequently cited as a leading neopragmatist text, written by a scholar of the American pragmatist
tradition).
8. Increasing concern about the problems of a robust political sphere in late modern societies
is reflected in the spate of recent publications revisiting modem theoretical foundations of the
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ing the progressive potential of identity politics, the continued salience of
class struggle (and the relationship between the two), and the meaning of
globalization imply less openly debated but, nevertheless, divergent understandings of the current structure of the political.9 A theoretical reworking of the political seems especially crucial if we are indeed experiencing an epochal shift in the constitution of authority and power of the
magnitude suggested by prognostications regarding the demise of the
nation-state. What each of the progressive prescriptions outlined above
shares is a certain national imaginary or sovereign ontology that seems to
inadequately respond to globalized conditions of authority and domination.
The four articles critically analyzed in this essay speak to various
problems of the nation and its transcendence, while implicating the
broader theoretical problems of a globalized political. E. San Juan's essay on violence and the nation is in large part a repudiation of particular
postcolonial/poststructural' ° rethinkings of the modem political. Ratna
Kapur's article on the political significance of subaltern sexuality in the
case of Indian sex workers stands as an indictment of the international
anti-trafficking movement's use of legal reform to address the multiform
subjugation of subaltern sex workers. Charles R. Venator Santiago's
paper on the spatial determinants of the neocolonial form of Puerto Rican
statutory citizenship argues that modem racist ideology played a mediated role in the creation of Puerto Ricans' second-class citizenship. Santiago's emphasis on the operation of ambiguity in the "Othering" of
Puerto Rican citizens reveals the hegemonic force of a race jurisprudence
that corresponds to more recent, global forms of race-based domination. t '
political. There are books discussed in this article that approach the problem of the political with a
postmodern understanding of the changes accompanying globalization. See MICHAEL HARDT &
ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPiRE (2000); GEORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND
BARE LIFE (Daniel Heller Roazen trans., 1998) (1995) [hereinafter AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER];
GEORGIO AGAMBEN, MEANS WITHOUT END: NOTES ON POLITICS (Vincenzo Benetti & Casare
Casarino trans., 2000) (1996) [hereinafter AGAMBEN, MEANS WITHOUT END]; R.B.J. Walker,

Politica4 International, Theoretical (2001) (delivering an unpublished manuscript as a paper at the
International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois) (manuscript on file with
author). The challenges of reconceptualizing the political under conditions of utilitarian liberal
democracy are usefully spelled out in the works of Carl Schmitt. Schmitt, a Nazi sympathizer, is an
embarrassing, though important precursor of contemporary reworkings of political theory, even for
progressives, because of his recognition of the dulling effects on the political of liberal democracy in
capitalist societies. See CARL SCHMrrr, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITIcAL (George Schwab trans.,
1996) (1932).
9. See generally David Kennedy, Receiving the International,10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1994)
(mapping the various understandings of how internationalization may affect politics).
10. I will use the term postcolonial/poststrctural as shorthand for the particular body of
theory that San Juan critiques. It should be clear that the term on its face could include theoretical
approaches that San Juan does not specifically critique here, and with which he may be in substantial
agreement. The reader should refer to San Juan's article for a closer designation of the particular
postcolonial and poststructural theory he critiques. See E. San Juan, Post-Colonialism and the
Question of Nation-State Violence, 78 DENY. U. L. REV. 891 (2001).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 97-98.
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Finally, Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas's piece on the role of racism in the
Spanish-American War and its colonial aftermath, which also contains a
reflection on positivist historiography, exemplifies a studied pragmatism
vis-a-vis the question of racism as a structural historical determinant.
Lazos Vargas thus advocates a more "disciplined" vision of politically
relevant critical race scholarship, which in this case means understanding
the fundamental imbrication of race and nation.
Reading through these pieces, one becomes aware of a common
sense of urgency, albeit uniquely expressed by each writer. It is almost as
if the writers were trying to warn of an impending catastrophe awaiting
progressives pursuing the wrong political strategy. In at least three of the
pieces there is a sense that some of us may be unwitting accomplices to a
politics we would otherwise wish to avoid. In some real sense a "crisis of
the political" seems to animate the work of these highly perceptive intellects. I propose reading the articles in this section as responses to the
political dilemmas posed by "Empire," an emerging system of global
domination that is distinguishable from previous modern political forms
of imperialism. 2
I have grouped the articles thematically in pairs, looking first at San
Juan and Kapur, then Santiago and Lazos Vargas. I will highlight the
points of convergence and disagreement within the pairs of articles and,
in the final section, consider the political crisis that is, arguably, the unnamed referent of these four articles. I will suggest how each writer's
work contributes to a reconceptualization of the (postmodern) political.
San Juan's essay works as part of a longer critical project he has pursued over a span of years. His recent book, Beyond PostcolonialTheory,
critiques mainstream postcolonial theory from the perspective of radical
political economy and Fanonian identity politics.' 3 As a general matter,
San Juan views postcolonial theory's interest and faith in "[h]ybridity,
heterogeneous and discrepant lifestyles, local knowledges, cyborgs" and
"borderland scripts" as tending to "obfuscate the power of the transnational ideology and practice of consumerism and its dehumanizing effects."' 4 In the present essay on violence and the nation San Juan offers a
provocative argument in favor of a Fanonian understanding of violence
on behalf of and through the nation as the "expression of subaltern
agency." In making this argument San Juan asserts the political relevance

12. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8. Hardt and Negri develop a theory of Empire that is a
sophisticated rethinking of the dilemmas facing traditional notions of the political. Hardt and Negri
explain that "[a]long with the global market and global circuits of production has emerged a global
order, a new logic and structure of rule-in short, a new form of sovereignty. Empire is the political
subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the
world." Id. at xi. See infra text accompanying notes 50-57.
13.

E. SAN JUAN, JR., BEYOND POSTCOLONIAL THEORY (1998).

14.

See id. at 8.
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of the nation in contradiction to the central thrust of postcolonial/poststructural theories of the nation.
San Juan's disagreement with postcolonial/poststructural theorists reflects the deeper ongoing dilemma of discerning the proper form and
focus of anti-systemic politics. As the revolutionary politics of the 1950s
and 60s recede further into the past, culturalist understandings of the
political have, understandably, proliferated. Anti-systemic scholars, perhaps as a result of having been weaned on the political ennui of the
Reagan-Bush and Clinton years, have turned their critical attention to the
ideological functions of prominent modern institutions-the nation-state,
the nuclear family, Enlightenment systems of knowledge production, etc.
For two generations of progressive humanities scholars, poststructuralism has provided a convincing answer to questions regarding their field's
political relevance. 15 A parallel response to a similarly perceived "crisis
of legitimacy" among critical legal scholars can be seen in various post6
structural approaches that increasingly problematize law as discourse.'
San Juan subjects these "culturalist empiricist" trends, which he suspects of tending toward a depoliticized liberal individualism, to materialist analysis. Whereas postcolonial/poststructural theory may categorically reject such political mega-subjects as the nation, race, women, or
gays/lesbians, San Juan seeks to evaluate the political meaning of such
collectives within given contexts. He thus invokes the structuralism of
Ernest Gelner and Benedict Anderson, whose work situated the modern
nation-state squarely within the trajectory of the modern political economy of commodity exchange. San Juan does not fully dismiss the culturalist claim regarding the mythological basis of nationhood so much as
he insists on a "both-and" approach that immediately positions the
imagined national community within a broader structural critique of
modern socioeconomic hegemony. For San Juan there is irony in postcolonialism/poststructuralism's categorical disparagement of the nation,
for him a nonfoundational, socially constructed element of analysis that
itself requires more contextualized analysis.
In a manner consistent with his "defense" of the nation, San Juan assesses national violence through a context-sensitive reading of the political space such violence opens. He first rejects a categorical conflation of
the nation with the state, a conflation evident in the very term "nation-

See ROBERT C. HOLUB, CROSSING BORDERS: RECEPTION THEORY, POSTSTRUCTURALISM,
111-12 (1992) (explaining the rise of poststructuralism in the humanities as, in
part, a reaction to the demise of radical student movements of the 1960s).
16. Several "law ands" and "new approaches" that have arisen over the past decade indicate
this trend. Law and anthropology, law and literature, and New Approaches to International Law, for
example, tend to emphasize the discursive aspects of law. Yamamoto critiques the trend as it is
manifested in progressive race theory. See YAMAMoTo, supra note 2, at 143 ("Progressive race
theory's tendency toward preoccupation with discourse is problematic, however, because it comes at
the overall expense of the concrete and particular.").
15.

DECONSTRUCTION
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state." Again building on the structural analysis of scholars such as Gellner, San Juan distinguishes state- from nation-driven violence. The state,
in this sense, is a uniquely modem institution that exists by, for, and of
capital, and violence that the state orchestrates directly and/or indirectly
serves capital's interests. Meanwhile, San Juan sees violence on behalf of
the people or nation as potentially anti-imperial and anti-capitalist in its
origins and effects. 7 Thus, such violence "demands dialectical triangulation" in order to avoid the unwarranted primitivization of a forceful collective resistance to capital's imperial structure. San Juan sees postcolonial/poststructural theory as essentializing such collective forms of violence, while failing to countenance how some of those forms may embody the emancipatory energy of counterhegemonic social collectives.
Thus, San Juan insists on analyzing nationalist violence beyond a rational/primordial binarism, seeing the nation form instead as neither inherently destabilizing/primordial, nor stabilizing/rational. Dialectical
triangulation means always adding the material/historical dimension to
the discursive analysis of such conceptual binaries.
San Juan further questions whether culturalist approaches to the nation and nationalism can explain the basic paradox of modem international political economic organization. This paradox lies in the dual
function of the nation-state as constrainer of cross-border flows (of
goods, people, capital, etc.) and enabler of global economic organization,
multi-national corporations and intergovernmental financial institutions.
From a culturalist perspective, San Juan argues, this paradox remains
unanalyzed since nationalist ideology implies a centripetal principle of
organization that would contradict neoliberal economic organization. San
Juan would instead explain the modem paradox of closed nation-states
sanctioning an open global economy by foregrounding how the class
dialectic works through the closed/open paradox, as the way in which the
capitalist system necessarily operationalizes international boundaries.
On a more general level San Juan's analysis of the nation and national violence stands in fundamental disagreement with postcolonial/poststructural theory regarding the nature of the political. For San
Juan, the collective agency of peoples, subaltern groups, anti-colonial
nations, and the non-bourgeois classes remains central to any theory of
emancipatory political action. For mainstream postcolonial/poststructural
theory these collectivities themselves constitute problematic forms, in the
case of nations perhaps even becoming the primary engine of domestic
economic and political oppression and, internationally, of colonialism.
San Juan's argument is that postcolonial/poststructural theory too quickly

17. To appreciate how San Juan understands "nation" or "people," one might recall Gramsci's
notion of the "national popular collective will," a term that indicated a counter-hegemonic and nonstatist collective political formation. See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECrIONS FROM THE PRISON
NOTEBOOKS 130-31 (Quinton Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. and trans., 1971).
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(as he says, in "quasi-Hegelian" manner) attributes oppression to the
collective abstraction of the nation as form. This leads automatically to
the conclusion, which San Juan rejects, that the notion of "decolonizing
nations" would be oxymoronic since the nation is incapable of serving as
a political vehicle for emancipation.
Violence for San Juan cannot be understood in a purely culturalist
register because that limits the focus to the "violence" of unifying ideas
and cultural forces that "suppress difference or negate multiple 'others'
not subsumed within totalities such as nation, class, gender, etc." Violence so construed leads to a truncated understanding of politics as an
"epiphenomenal manifestation of discourse and language-games." Indeed, San Juan sees culturalist "contextualism" as partly responsible for
the continued salience of identity politics, since such a critical posture
"reproduces the condition for refusing to attack the causes of class exploitation and racial violence." Perhaps most disappointing for San Juan
is his sense that postcolonial/poststructural critics summarily dismiss all
Third World revolutionary projects, even those pursuing emancipatory
goals.
San Juan turns to Fanon's analysis of anti-colonial violence in
working towards an alternative framing of the problem. In Fanon's synthesis of historical materialism and (an early version of) critical race theory, San Juan finds a corrective to culturalist interpretations of national
culture and violence. San Juan describes this Fanonian synthesis in terms
of a national culture whose content comes directly from the resistance
efforts of the colonized. It is not the form of the nation for Fanon (or San
Juan) that is to be problematized, but rather the specific historical conditions of a given national formation. National culture is thus historicized,
that is, understood as the "whole body of efforts made by a people" in
the ideational realm to resist its subjugation and destruction. In the particular Algerian revolutionary context that Fanon studied, these "cultural" efforts are inseparable from the practices of concrete anti-colonial
politics.
Fanon transcends the particular/universal dilemma of liberal philosophy (for example, as now reflected in the cultural relativism debates in
the field of human rights) by theorizing anti-colonial national culture and
violence as a particular "original idea propounded as an absolute."'' The
parallel notion of a "concrete universal" is important for San Juan in that
it countenances a poststructural epistemological stance, while also embracing the nationalist framings of liberation struggles. On one hand,
Fanon (San Juan) rejects the liberal universalism that underwrote white

18. See FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 41 (Constance Farrington trans.)
(1963). Fanon dedicates a chapter to the question of violence in anti-colonial nationalist movements.
In the passage quoted he is discussing the relationship between universalist rationality and the
particular historical dialectic of de-colonization.
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supremacist, Eurocentric colonial civilizing missions. On the other hand,
the particular instances of nationalist anti-colonial struggle can be categorically endorsed contrary to postcolonial/poststructural approaches that
reject both the underlying essentialization of subalterns into a revolutionary nation and the accompanying emancipatory metanarrative. The universal thus propounded-nationalist revolutionary anti-colonialismgrows from the particular historical context of colonial domination and resistance thereto, hence the term "concrete universal."
Fanon's historicist understanding of national culture (that is, as tied
to politics and economics) underwrites San Juan's claim that culturalist
postcolonial/poststructural theory relies on an abstraction when it celebrates liminality, border ontologies, and transcultural syncretisms at the
expense of collectivities such as the nation. For San Juan, the "peoples"
behind such abstractions represent compromised visions of the political.
San Juan wants to re-wed the more loosely conceived postmodern notions of social justice to a modernist collective goal of national selfdetermination. To the extent that postcolonial/poststructural theory insists on an anti-nationalist understanding of social justice, the political
domain within which such a project can be pursued is similarly sub- or
anti-national. San Juan feels that this parsing of the political creates an
unnecessary dichotomy. Following Fanon, he asserts that national selfdetermination and social justice struggles can be interdependent, particularly when they involve a fundamental commitment to anti-capitalist
struggle. The resulting notion of the political is thus imbued with both
material and identity-based elements.
An important part of San Juan's reworking of the political is his insistence that a critical distinction be made between, on the one hand, the
notion of sovereignty as a function of the emancipatory politics of a nation or people and, on the other, the hegemonic role of state "sovereigns"
as instruments of elite class interests. San Juan works this distinction
through his analysis of violence. He expands the definition of violence to
include the pervasive structural violence of the bourgeois state (and the
commodifications and markets it enables) that he finds inscribed in the
very rule of law of the Rechtstaat. Moreover, drawing on Walter Benjamin's distinction between the divine ends of justice and the profane
means of law (as force), San Juan suggests a transvaluation of political
violence to take place beyond the usual liberal rational dichotomy of
means versus ends. This dichotomy insidiously precludes critical appreciation of political confrontation through the application of such enshrined cliches as "ends can never justify means."
Thus San Juan would have us view the "legal" means of the liberal
state-which collapses justice into due process without regard for social
outcome-as violence, while understanding that the violent "means"
used by the nation/people to achieve anti-capitalist self-determination are

2001]

IDENTITY AND CRISIS

"justified" because they grow from the historical dialectic of class struggle. (San Juan is quick to point out that both violent and peaceful means
of struggle may be necessary and should be evaluated according to the
narrative of emancipation from oppression.) For San Juan, a central
shortcoming of postcolonial/poststructural theory, if it misunderstands
the significance of violence and misconstrues the domain of the political,
lies in the way it mirrors the ends/means rationality of liberal philosophy.
In particular, just as violent struggle may sometimes be the appropriate
outgrowth of the colonial dialectic, so too can totalities such as the nation, the working class and so on be appropriate political agents of
change, regardless of our postmodern aversion to such essentialized
"'means."
Finally, San Juan adapts Benjamin's resolution of the ends-means
dualism in buttressing his defense of the nation. Benjamin concluded that
the possibility of justice ("divine ends") was foreclosed in the realm of
law (the debased means for enforcing the liberal social contract). Benjamin saw educative and communicative power as counter-forces to the
state's juridical-cum-violent, enforcement of social contract hierarchies.
For San Juan, Benjamin's notion of educative power and communication
implies the collective action of the nation. San Juan's reading of Benjamin here is ingenious since it plumbs the complexity of a thinker who
was a sophisticated critic of Enlightenment rationality, historicist notions
of progress, and liberal political and legal structures, but who also arguably preserved a modernist faith in the redemptive power of truly emancipatory, quasi-sovereign collective forms of agency. San Juan has us see
this faith as a nuanced conceptual embrace of contestational political
agency, collective or otherwise. Indeed, a normative aversion to sovereign power, as Carl Schmitt famously recognized, is a classical conceit
of liberals, a label San Juan does not hesitate to affix to postcolonial/poststructural theorists.
Ratna Kapur's work contrasts in many ways with San Juan's, though
one may certainly find some overlapping concerns as well. Kapur's subjects are subaltern sex workers, with particular focus on sex workers in
postcolonial India. Kapur argues that sex work can be an arena of politics
wherein subaltern women empower themselves through acts of economic
self-determination, while also resisting the patriarchal and repressive
sexual mores of postcolonial society. 9 The article critiques western depictions of subaltern sex workers, especially those of First World feminists. Kapur argues that such depictions have created a "victim-subject"
of subaltern sex workers. These depictions stand in contrast to romanticized images of Western and white prostitutes, as exemplified by Julia

19. See also Prabha Kotiswaran, Preparingfor Civil Disobedience: Indian Sex Workers and
the Law, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161 (2001) (discussing Indian sex work from a similar
perspective as that of Kapur in her contribution here).
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Roberts' "pretty woman" character. Kapur shows how the victim-subject
pervades recent legal reform efforts that attempt to constrain the international trafficking of women for prostitution.
Kapur traces the current framing of sexual work and sexuality in India to the colonial period. British imperialists and Indian nationalists
similarly manipulated representations of Indian women's sexuality for
political advantage. For the British, "sexual contamination" in the colonial encounter became a common rationale behind efforts to legislate
disciplinary Victorian morality. For Indian nationalists, Indian cultureas preserved in the Indian home-was an important trope of resistance to
colonization. Indian cultural purity came to be equated with Indian
women's chastity. There is an irony in the way both sides of the colonial
equation are informed by their opposite numbers in the encounter. As
Kapur points out, Indian nationalists were influenced by British Victorian morality and, as Laura Ann Stoler and others have shown, European
sexuality itself was heavily influenced by the colonial experience.'
Kapur argues that one type of Indian feminism, which frames itself
as anti-imperial and nationalist, has conflated a traditionalist image of
"authentic" Indian female subjectivity with sexual purity. From this conservative feminist perspective, sex work represents a derogation of Indian female subjecthood. Indian sex workers, in contrast to Western sex
workers, are coerced by economic destitution into prostitution. This coercion represents a particularly insidious and communally significant
form of violence since it deprives these women of their culturally
authentic sexual chastity. Western sex workers are not subject to such
violence since they operate within a market culture that brooks no exogenous moral code. The broader debate among feminists regarding the
question of sex work legalization thus resolves according to a familiar
(and patronizing) East-West cultural binarism, with legalization being
appropriate in the nontraditional market cultures of the West but not in
the more conservative and moralistic cultures of the East.
Kapur points out that this form of feminist cultural relativism serves
the conservative agenda of the Hindu Right in India. Government policies that have been promulgated in the area of sex work have not protected the human rights of the women workers involved, but rather have
increased the disciplinary reach of officials over the women in the name
of preserving Indian cultural integrity. In particular, the handling of the
AIDS crisis has shown the tendency of the state, encouraged by conservative feminists, to deal with sex work-related issues through the further
criminalization and disciplining of sex workers at a time when they need
enhanced government services and protections. Moreover, the notions of

20.

See generally ANN LAURA STOLER, RACE AND THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE (1995);

ROBERT J. C. YOUNG, COLONIAL DESIRE: HYBRIDrrY IN THEORY, CULTURE AND RACE (1995).

20011

IDENTITY AND CRISIS

rescue and rehabilitation, central to proactive state and conservative
feminist approaches to sex work, bespeak the kind of disempowering
victim-subject image Kapur finds at work behind the subjugation of subaltern sex workers.
A central point of contention in feminist debates regarding sex work
is whether women can ever really engage in consensual sex for pay."
Some feminists group prostitution with rape, maintaining that consent is
contextually vitiated by the objectification and commodification of the
female body inherent in any sex-for-pay transactions." Others have argued that consent to sex for pay is not only possible, but that such consent is crucial to understanding the social and political agency of women
sex workers. 3 This notion of agency is important to a feminist conceptualization of the political as a site of resistance to the constraining morality of nationalist and patriarchal culture. Kapur points out that the consent debate actually instantiates an East-West binarism by presenting the
quintessentially non-consenting prostitute as a Third World woman subject to coercive forms trafficking. Kapur argues that even those Western
feminists who defend consensual sex work engage in a form of cultural
imperialism by distinguishing between Third World victim prostitutes
and First World consenting sex workers.
Kapur draws on the work of Kempadoo and Doezema in positing a
less ethnocentric approach to the issue of political empowerment for sex
workers. From this perspective, both First World and Third World sex
workers may be engaged in acts of self-determination. Thus, rather than
assessing the consent question according to relative levels of economic
coercion, Kapur suggests that we understand both subaltern and Western
sex workers as autonomous market actors. Kapur advocates an approach
that moves past the false binarisms of culture and consent towards a
rights-based agenda that takes the political wherever it can be found.

21. For a recent article that proposes moving past this debate, see generally Beverly Balos &
Mary Louise Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution: Becoming Respectable, 74 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1220
(1999) (arguing for decriminalization, but also a civil cause of action that prostitutes could use
against those profiting from what the authors argue amounts to a violation of their civil rights).
22. See, e.g., KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTrrUTION OF SEXUALrrY 36-38, 79-90 (1995).
Barry argues that understanding prostitution as something other than rape creates a distinction
without a difference. Both rape and prostitution are male-driven sexual subordinations of women.
The overall male-dominated economy of sexual power renders these acts experientially equivalent.
Parsing sexual subordination along the lines of individual consent misses the point as far as Barry is
concerned. The patriarchal sexual order works equally well through rape or consensual prostitution.
Individualized notions of the political that are inherent in the claim that women as market actors can
"consent" to prostitution prevent the formation of effective feminist political consciousness
necessary to combat the system of domination.
23. See generally GLOBAL SEX WORKERS (Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema eds.) (1998)
(taking this position in the international context of sex work and trafficking). For works taking a
non-abolitionist stance, see generally those cited in Balos & Fellows, supra note 21, at 1291 n.323.
24. See GLOBAL SEX WORKERS, supra note 23.
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Unfortunately, Kapur finds little in recent legal reform efforts to suggest
a systemic move in that direction.
Kapur argues that both international law and domestic statutory
schemes that target trafficking in women and children are premised upon
the subject-victim image of the subaltern sex worker. In both cases, the
primary legal thrust is criminalization of the act of trafficking informed
by a concern that national borders are being violated. Moreover, the legal
interventions are heavily moralistic in that the crime of trafficking depends upon an underlying persecution of prostitution. Trafficking for
purposes of domestic labor, for example, would fall outside the purview
of these reforms. The laws (of the United States in particular) favor "pure
victims," i.e., those who do not willingly cross borders in pursuit of their
profession, who are thus "innocent" of consensual transnational sex
work.
Of particular concern in the case of the United States' law is the way
in which anti-trafficking concerns have become subsumed into an antiimmigration and neo-imperial foreign policy framework. Kapur points
out how anti-immigration discourse informed the drafting of antitrafficking legislation, as well as the extent to which that law imposes
sanctions on (Third World) countries that do not implement measures to
curb the cross-border traffic in sex workers. Ironically, it is precisely the
institutionalized policing of borders and increasingly Kafkaesque immigration regulation that make trafficking a profitable underground activity.
As a counterpoint to regressive feminist and juridical approaches to
sex work, Kapur describes the efforts of Indian sex workers who exercise
their agency through social movement organizations that advocate sex
workers' rights. Some of these organizations are also waging a cultural
battle against the moralistic Right by challenging narrow definitions of
sexuality and the suturing of such quasi-Victorian notions of sexuality to
conservative political agendas. The initiative taken by Indian sex workers
directly refutes the victim-subject construction by asserting transnational
market actor status for the women involved. Moreover, Kapur finds in
the sex workers' political agenda a departure from feminist interpretations of sex work as derivative of patriarchal culture and economic necessity. Instead, the overt politicization of sex work is premised upon sex
workers' conscious crafting of a strategy to escape the patriarchal culture
of the family and marriage, institutions tied to the conservative definition
of female sexuality.
Importantly, the sex worker movement works towards legitimizing
women workers' rights to transnational mobility. Thus, the politicization
of sex work, which openly challenges the construction of sex work as
national moral decay, leads in turn to a reframing of the legal "problem"
of trafficking. As the anti-trafficking campaign has been mainstreamed
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within the law-making institutions of Western democracies, the political
space that had been opened up by feminist and women-and-development
activists has been closed down or corrupted. The true assertion of political agency by the sex workers would represent a re-capturing of that
space. The anti-trafficking legal reforms Kapur discusses are revealed as
nationalist and moralistic diversions from the rights-oriented approach of
progressive activists in the field. We should note the importance of this
ongoing "politicization from below" as a necessary corrective to the cycle of co-optation that occurs when the political initiative of transnational
advocacy, such as the anti-trafficking campaign, becomes side-tracked
by the official "human rights" law-making apparatus.
Much could be gained by reading writers like San Juan and Kapur
as complementary, a move that may not seem obvious given the two
writers' contrasting theoretical standpoints and apparently distinct normative commitments. On the one hand, a historicizing defense of the
nation and national violence could be enriched by further specification
with regard to the question of gender oppression. Many of the postcolonial and race nationalisms of the recent past do not fare well under the
scrutiny of gender (or for that matter sexuality) critique. Granting San
Juan's point about the need to historicize our analysis of the nation, we
might still heed the "internal" critique of Third World and critical race
feminists who are themselves constituent adherents of collective nationalist and race conscious politics. Progressive nationalism, as one important political project of anti-Empire, should certainly reject bourgeois
culturalism, but also patriarchal (and homophobic) ideology and
practice.]5
On the other hand, Kapur's critique of the anti-trafficking lawmaking and defense of the agency of sex workers in the face a concomitant victim-subjectification could be deepened by a historicization of the
market for sex work. Positing sex workers as market actors is a necessary
corrective to the Victorian morality play26 scripted by both liberal humanitarians and conservative nationalists. However, a further critical step
could be taken by problematizing the truncated agency allowed by the
market within which the women exercise their "autonomy." Such a step
would perhaps entail looking both to the demand side of the sex industry
(subjecting the subject-consumer to race, class and sexuality analysis)
and to the political economy of sex work (how surplus value is created
and appropriated, how commodification and transnational circulation
contribute to worker oppression, etc.). Liberalizing the movement of
25. It should be noted that San Juan's book includes an incisive life history of Maria Lorena
Barros, a feminist Filipino nationalist, which occasions a serious engagement with the question of
women and anti-colonial nationalist struggle. See SAN JuAN, supra note 13, at 43-50.
26. I examine the staging of something resembling a Victorian morality play in the antitrafficking discourse in Gil Gott, Caught in Traffic 5 (Aug. 2001) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

workers--certainly a reasonable demand in the face of the distorting
effect on markets of national borders-begs the question posed from the
perspective of radical political economy regarding the structural violence
of the market in forcing the uprooting of workers from their communities 27
.
Looking at the structural dimension of sex workers' political
empowerment can flesh out Kapur's notion of a "politics of desire,"
which offers important insights into how struggle over cultural meaning
can empower Third World women. After all, Western sex workers, presumably less constrained by the moralistic power of conservative nationalism than their Third World counterparts, must still politically confront
the structural determinants of their subjugation. "The recuperation of
desire as a political strategy" should not make of necessity a virtue by
failing to address the structural limits of sex worker empowerment within
a transnational capitalist economy of desire. Contestation at the level of
the state and in the realm of production (a la so-called "old social movements" ) remains indispensable.
Interestingly, Kapur and San Juan present potentially complementary visions of the political, especially with regard to the place of law in
progressive politics. San Juan is obviously skeptical of the rule of law as
a means for achieving social justice, seeing it as a potent purveyor of
structural class violence. Likewise, Kapur provides a concrete account of
how legal reformism fails to fulfill an emancipatory political agenda.
Meanwhile, San Juan's rehabilitation of "essentialized" collective political subjects such as the nation, and his defense of confrontational political action such as anti-imperialist violence on behalf of national selfdetermination do not gainsay the importance of "micro-level" political
action by non-national collectivities such as women, especially where
such groups are further defined through the segmentation of national and29
international labor markets as in the case of domestic and sex laborers.
And while, as San Juan suggests, the human rights establishment may
indeed be complicit in neoliberal Empire, a rights-based campaign such
as the one Kapur documents on behalf of sex workers may indeed be
important in the type of Gramscian war of position facing progressives
under current political conditions. 30

27. See Gil Gott, CriticalRace Globalism?: Global PoliticalEconomy, and the Intersection of
Race, Nation, and Class, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1503, 1508 (2000) [hereinafter Gott, CriticalRace
Globalism?];HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 154-55.
28. See discussion infra note 42.
29. See SAN JuAN, supra note 13, at 44-5.
30. See also Kimberd Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988) (defending the
pragmatic importance of rights from the perspective of Critical Race Theory).
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The second pair of articles addresses the question of relations between the United States and peoples who are under U.S. imperial control.
Charles R. Venator Santiago assesses the relationship between, and the
relative importance of, racism and spatial ontology in the creation of
second class (statutory) citizenship for Puerto Ricans. Santiago argues
that there is no linear causal link between late 19" century U.S. racism
and the treatment of Puerto Rico at the time of United States' overseas
imperial expansion. Instead, Santiago argues that the dominant racist
ideology of the day was inflected through a uniquely spatialized imperial
imagination that created, in addition to an "inside" and an "outside," a
kind of permanent threshold or liminal space that defined the boundary
between the two. To illustrate, Santiago analogizes to Foucault's notion
of the liminal in the case of the madman's journey whereby those
deemed insane were sequestered in a kind of permanent voyage between
the early modem city and its exterior.
Santiago's argument here resonates with the important work of Rob
Walker in the field of international relations. Walker has cogently argued
for the primacy of the spatial binary (inside/outside) in the constitution of
the modem political imagination.3' Santiago's extension of this critical
insight is that an ambiguous "in-between" space structures the political
possibilities of marginal colonial groups such as Puerto Ricans. This
argument provides a nuanced understanding of United States-style colonialism (and, I would add, racial hegemony), in that it analyzes how a
racist hierarchy works even in the absence of rigidly distinct categories
of racial difference, such as those inherent in biologistic forms of white
supremacy. As Hardt and Negri argue, such a shifting, amorphous understanding of difference is endemic to conditions of racial management that
characterize Empire.32 In effect, liberal jurisprudence governs difference
on behalf of neoliberal political economy through the deployment of
ambiguity.33
Following Santiago, we can see the roots of today's liberal race jurisprudence in the imperial law of the Spanish-American War. Santiago
traces the creation of the ambiguous or liminal space of Puerto Ricans
through the Treaty of Paris, the post-War military regime, the Foraker
Act of 1900 and, finally, the pronouncements of the Insular Cases. The
resulting legal regime defined the United States' relationship to Puerto
Rico in a way that is at once both unique and nested within evolving
forms of modem racial hegemony. Santiago discusses three features of
this relationship in particular: the doctrine of Puerto Rican unincorporation (subject to U.S. sovereignty, but "foreign in a domestic sense"), the
31. See Walker, supra note 8, at 43-49.
32. HARDT & NEGRI, supranote 8, at 190-95.
33. The U.S. Supreme Court's post-Civil Rights race jurisprudence has, ironically, embraced
poststructural anti-essentialism in dismantling the legal reforms that relied on clear-cut racial
categorizations, group-based harms and systemic notions of discrimination.
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colonial status of Puerto Rico as possession of, but not part of the United
States, and the affirmation of a distinct form of Puerto Rican "citizenship.
Santiago is careful not to place the colonial regime that was created
for Puerto Rico and the concomitant construction of Puerto Ricans as an
"alien race" completely outside the broader flow of United States' racial
formation. What is remarkable is the apparent ease with which the racial
order was able to accommodate yet another category of racial otherness
and subsume it under the existing "racial contract."4 From Santiago's
reading of the Insular Cases it is clear how the Justices projected the
dominant racist imaginary onto the new territories and their inhabitants.
However, as Santiago points out with regard to the relatively privileged
"nonalien" status granted by the Court to Puerto Ricans under the otherwise racially exclusionary immigration laws, modem racial jurisprudence
was infinitely flexible in applying its forms of exclusion and subjugation
to some but not all racial categories. Each distinct "juridical space" is a
mutually reinforcing part of an interlocking web of racial discipline and
stratification. Indeed, it is important to note that the modem spatialization of racial difference highlighted by Santiago actually had a counterpart in Black-white relations of the same period, most apparent in the
Court's Jim Crow ("separate but equal") jurisprudence.
The second piece dealing with this historical period, by Sylvia R.
Lazos Vargas, adopts a method known in the social sciences as most
similar systems design.5 Lazos Vargas asks what explains the different
outcomes of the otherwise mostly similar nineteenth wars of conquestthe mid-century Mexican American War and the Spanish American War
of fifty years later. The discrepant variable Lazos Vargas sets out to explain regards the disparate treatment of, on the one hand, Mexican citizens in the conquered territories pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and, on the other hand, Puerto Ricans and Guamanians under the
Treaty of Paris. In the former case, Mexicans in the conquered territories
were given the choice of becoming United States' citizens. In the latter,
no such choice was granted Puerto Ricans and Guamanians, and instead
a second-class juridical status is created.
Lazos Vargas's research hypothesis was that a racist "smoking gun"
would be found to explain the treatment of the Puerto Ricans and Guamanians. Although Lazos Vargas failed to turn up such a smoking gun,
she is able to conclude that a more complex, nationalist racial formation
obtained, resonant perhaps with Santiago's notion of an ambiguous or
34. The "racial contract" is Charles Mills' term to describe the actually existing social contract
of the United States and other European-based settler societies, self-described as open, liberal and
democratic. See CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT (1997).
35. See generally ADAM PRZEWORSKI & HENRY TEUNE, THE LOGIC OF COMPARATIVE
SOCIAL INQUIRY

31-46 (1982).
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liminal racialized space.36 Along the way Lazos Vargas raises some important theoretical and methodological points and, as important, challenges critical race scholars to embrace a philosophical pragmatism in
their work.
One of the more provocative points Lazos Vargas makes involves
rethinking the place of the Spanish American War in the trajectory of
United States' racial formation and the construction of Latino identity
and social status. Following Walter Mignolo, Lazos Vargas centers the
Spanish American War in the modem trajectory of Latino racial identity
in the United States. In agreement with Santiago, Lazos Vargas sees the
late 19 a century as a turning point of sorts, away from strictly biologistic
forms of white supremacy toward an increasingly cultural understanding
of racial Otherness. In this new form, white supremacy cast itself in humanitarian garb and assumed the position of a civilizing force of progress out to uplift "backward" cultures.37
As Hardt and Negri point out, this culturalized (postmodern) version
of racial difference is more insidious than the outright biologistic forms
of racial exclusion that liberalism eschews. Race as cultural difference
can be framed in the same absolute terms as biological difference (radical incommensurability), and can be defended under liberal dogma (individual freedom) as a moral basis for group-based exclusion.38 Lazos Vargas argues that this shift retroactively affects interpretation of the earlier
Mexican American War conquest and, thus, influences the formation of
Chicano subaltern status. This argument contrasts with the work of Chicano Studies scholars who have argued that the earlier conquest had created an internal colony, an "occupied America, ',' and a material, territorial, and cultural legacy of racial Otherness that has since determined
Chicano social history. Lazos Vargas posits instead an "overarching
structure" of Latino cultural Otherness resulting from the later imperial
period. This framework would also explain the United States' culturally
inflected (Anglocentric) foreign policy toward Latin American countries
throughout the twentieth century.

36. Several writers have analyzed the role of racism in the Spanish-American War from a
cultural studies perspective, i.e., by examining a different set of data from that examined by Lazos
Vargas. See, e.g., Maria DeGuzmin, Consolidating Anglo-American Imperial Identity Around the
Spanish-American War (1898), in RACE AND THE PRODUCTION OF MODERN AMERICAN
NATIONALISM 97-122 (Reynolds J. Scott-Childress ed., 1999) (examining literary and graphic
representations of Spain in 19' h century America and arguing that the imperial notion of Manifest
Destiny was racially coded). See generally MICHAEL HUNT, IDEOLOGY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
46-91 (1987) (tracing the impact of racism on U.S. foreign policy, including during the era of
imperialism).
37. For a history of the contemporaneous (1890s) French notion of a civilizing mission in
Africa, see ALICE L. CONKLIN, A MISSION TO CIVILIZE (1998).
38. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 190-95.
39. See generally RODOLFO ACU4A, OCCUPIED AMERICA (1972); see also MARIO BARRERA,
RACE AND CLASS IN THE SOUTHWEST (1979).
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Lazos Vargas includes a thoughtful reflection on the benefits of
pragmatist self-critique in overcoming the problem of positionality in
historical analysis. This reflection takes seriously the charges leveled
against critical forms of legal scholarship from conservatives such as
Richard Posner and racial neoconservatives such as Dan Farber and
Suzanna Sherry. These writers have attacked the objectivity of progressive scholars who use history or critical race methodology to push for
legal reforms. Lazos Vargas calls for a pragmatist commitment in response to these attacks. Such an approach would force the ideological
and identity positionality of critical race scholars to the fore ("field positionality"), leading ultimately toward the production of a more effective
racial critical scholarship. Moreover, legal scholars would acknowledge
"law's troubled relationship with history" ("disciplinary positionality")
and commit themselves to a more studied approach to historical research
that would include the use of primary and archival sources
In the critical race and LatCrit context, this call to a more selfreflective form of scholarship amounts to a re-visioning of the political to
include pragmatist knowledge production. Implicit is the understanding
that an avowedly activist scholarly disposition may not be the most effective way of operating on the current intellectual plane. Stating this
argument in Gramscian terms, the present war of position--over ideas,
values, knowledge, etc.-requires a less agonistic scholarly stance. Critical scholars cannot simply ignore the rules of the scholarly game, a game
in the social sciences that is still heavily positivist in its commitment to
testable hypotheses, falsification and empiricist notions of objectivity
and ontology.
Interestingly, each of these four writers sheds light on the problem
of the political through analysis of colonialism's juridical legacy. In each
case the structure of post-colonial legal liberalism is shown to condition
late modem forms of hegemony and, importantly, the processes by which
authority is constituted. Assessing the conditions of possibility for antisystemic political contestation under post-colonial legal regimes is, of
course, an important part of a theoretical reworking of the political.
These articles move us closer to an understanding of how postcolonial
legal liberalism as a historical system, i.e., one homologously related to
colonial and imperial expansion, conditions current and future prospects
for the emergence of a viable progressive political space. In the next section I will expand on this point by reading these articles through the lens
of postmodern international political theory.
CRISIS AND BEYOND

I understand the "crisis of the political" to refer to a set of conditions
under which we are no longer sure about where and how progressive
politics can be effectively pursued. Our uncertainty probably results pri-
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marily from the fact that power and, even more importantly, particular
authorizations to wield power, now seem to originate and flow in ways
not accounted for by traditional theories of revolutionary politics.4° What
good does it do to "topple the state," if the state is merely the valet of
more imperious forces operating across the many "scapes" that combine
to form the postmodern social matrix.4 ' The debates on the Left about
whether "old" or "new" types of social movements are better suited to
the task of challenging for power (control of the processes of authorization) reflect the underlying uncertainties about where we should locate
the political in order to deal with changing system(s) of domination.
Should we continue the traditional revolutionary path and vie for state
power, alter redistribution situationally through workers' associations,
focus on international or transnational norm construction and the institutions and regimes to enforce them, try to rebalance power in the family
or the local community, struggle against the production of capitalist,
racist and patriarchal subjects through the various culture industries, or
target our efforts toward management of the ecosphere using public and
private means to achieve our goals? The array of choices is dizzying.4 3
40. For one of the most sophisticated articulations of a more traditional leftist politics, i.e., as
informed by the writings of Marx, see RALPH MiLtBAND, MARXISM AND PoLITICS 154-190 (1977).
41. 1 refer here, of course, to Arjun Appadarai's notion of scapes, a suffix he uses to capture
the fluid and differentiated, yet structurally similar global networks of force. Appadarai lists
ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, fmancescapes, and ideoscapes as five dimensions of the
new global cultural economy. See ARuUN APPADARAI, MODERNrrY AT LARGE 27-47, 33 (1996).
42. The designations "old" and "new" distinguish the worker movements of the early to mid
20 P century from the later civil rights and identity-based movements, including environmentalism.
For an excellent summary of the old versus new social movement debate and a new theory of
"subaltern movements" that transcends the somewhat artificial dichotomy of the old/new debate, see
LAURA PULIDO, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE: TWO CHICANO STRUGGLES IN THE

SoUTHwEST 3-56 (1996).

More broadly, the relationship between social movement theory, which has been a
predominantly backward-looking project aimed at explaining (if not preserving) a notion of 1960s
radicalism, and more recent theoretical work on civil society is indicative of the underlying dilemma
of the political. Social movements, once deemed a crucial vehicle for contesting power outside the
confines of state institutions, spoke directly to the power of the state, maintaining a vision of
contesting power over state apparatuses. Moreover, social movements were seen as operating apart
from markets, if not radically opposing them. To the contrary, civil society purportedly sites action
that is, theoretically at least, nonstatist in nature. In addition, civil society is viewed as fundamentally
compatible with, if not directly functional within, the market. Both.conservative and progressive
visions of civil society have been circulated, but also critiqued from the perspective of global justice
advocates, especially outside the West.
Critics of the recent faith in civil society are skeptical of the progressive political potential
in a private domain of "free association" that is made possible by the very same liberal system of
individual property rights that legitimates social exclusion and inequalities in wealth, power and
freedom. Somewhat less credibly, criticism of "new social movements" adopts this historical
materialist perspective. However, as Hardt and Negri point out, the salience of new social
movements might better be understood by appreciating the "profound economic power" they
embody, given the "increasing indistinguishability of economic and cultural phenomena." HARD &
NEGRI, supra note 8, at 275.
43. The decidedly cynical coverage of recent anti-globalization protests from Seattle (WTO)
to Genoa (G-8) has seized on the necessarily multivariate responses to globalization in discounting
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In addition to the destabilizing political experiences "on the
ground," we are further unsettled by a growing awareness that our most
fundamental political concepts themselves (sovereignty, freedom, the
nation, representation, rights, civil society, etc.) have always been essentially paradoxical. These conceptual destabilizations are particularly evident in the problematic of globalization. Whatever globalization might
entail as a new set of actual practices, it has become a discursive lighting
rod for the voicing of doubts about received notions of what constitutes a
legitimate and meaningful political sphere. Most notable, perhaps, has
been the de-privileging of sovereignty as an unchallenged and foundational concept in Western theories of the political. In addition to the now
commonplace pronouncements regarding the demise of the state as an
institution, a great deal has also been written about the conceptual limits
of theories of sovereignty. In the shadow of globalization, poststructuralists have exposed the discursive contingency of sovereignty, while
feminists, materialists, and race crits reveal aspects of sovereignty's social constructedness." These situated assaults on the sovereignty of sovereignty, as it were, move us in the direction of new conceptions of what,
where and by whom "legitimate" politics can be.
Several recent projects to rethink the political, which specifically
adopt a global perspective and, thus, attempt to move beyond the modem
sovereignty-bound political imaginary, warrant the attention of critical
race and postcolonial scholars. As I argued at an earlier LatCrit conference, racial justice paradigm formation would benefit from looking back
and re-engaging with the anti-imperialist, internationalist past of racebased struggle. 5 In this section I would like to consider whether, and
how, we might also look out at critical international political theory emanating from the postmodem Left in pursuing critical race globalism. I
will limit the analysis here to three such postmodern theoretical projects
(Hardt and Negri,' Walker47 and Agamben 5 ), which I take as representative of a fairly wide range of new theoretical perspectives. For the sake
of road mapping (only), we might label these approaches postmodern
the entire movement as chaotic and misguided. Liberal and neoconservative columnists deploying
this rhetoric correctly identify this symptom of the political crisis in the proliferating forms of
resistance, but they of course use it for propagandistic ends. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign
Affairs; Evolutionaries, N.Y..TIMEs, July 20, 2001, at A21 ("To be against globalization is to be
against so many things -- from cell phones to trade to Big Macs -- that it connotes nothing. Which is
why the anti-globalization protests have produced noise but nothing that has improved anyone's
life.").
44. See, e.g., CYNTHIA WEBER, SIMULATING SOVEREIGNTY: INTERVENTION, THE STATE AND
SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE (1995) (deconstructing sovereignty); JENS BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY OF

SOVEREIGNTY (1995) (arguing that sovereignty is historically constructed through a contingent
discourse of "insides" and "outsides").
45. See Gott, CriticalRace Globalism?,supra note 27.
46.

HARDT & NEGRI, supranote 8.

47.
48.

Walker, supra note 8.
See works by AGAMBEN, supra note 8.
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materialist (Hardt and Negri), poststructural IR 9 (Walker), and deconstructive (Agamben). Through the lens of this body of international political theory, I will suggest some more expansive readings of the four
articles analyzed above.
Hardt and Negri's concept of Empire is a very workable starting
point for understanding the changing conditions of power and authority.
Opposing Empire to the modernist system of imperialism, Hardt and
Negri suggest that a new form of power, a "postmodern sovereignty,"
has replaced modernist forms that had been exported from Europe
through colonialism and imperialism.t e Applicable across a range of social formations and concepts, the theory of Empire captures the shifts in
political and economic order accompanying globalization. Of primary
importance are the new ways in which power now operates as if there
were a globalized "universal republic." 5' Analogous to the United States'
revolutionary break with monarchic and absolutist forms of sovereignty,
postmodern sovereignty utilizes an "open" and expansive version of
network power, whereby "[s]overeignty can be exercised within a vast
horizon of activities that subdivide it without negating its unity and that
subordinate it continually to the creative movement of the multitude. 5 2
Modern transcendent forms of power and authority (transcendent sovereignty) are replaced by this postmodern form, which approximates the
deterritorialized, flexible and mobile workings of markets.53 Capitalism's
"plane of immanence," characterized by effective management of social
difference (race, religion, sexuality, gender) and a lack of any single
transcendent, territorialized locus of power and authority replaces modernist, unitary and territorialized forms.54

49.

IR is commonly used as an acronym for the field of study known as international relations.

50.

HARDT AND NEGRI, supra note 8, at 138.

51. Id. at 166.
52. Id. at 162.
53. Id. at 160-203.
54. Id. at 325-350. Theorists have often sought to resolve the dilemma (seemingly always at
the heart of bourgeois liberal political order) by championing one or the other of the two versions of
authority as more authentic or more utilitarian, perhaps even more ethically defensible than the
other. Most recently, under neoliberalism's "Washington consensus," authorization in the form of
the market mechanism and capitalism's imperatives has been winning the day, at least rhetorically.
Conversely, Carl Schmitt began a conservative tradition that valorizes the transcendent approach to
sovereignty when he lamented the loss of the political, defined in absolutist terms as the authority to
decide exceptions to the rule of law. Schmitt thought that liberal democracy submerged the essential
political experience, which he conceived as an untethered binary process rigidly distinguishing
friends from enemies, and law from that which is excepted from law's "universalist" operation.
Schmitt reviled what he saw as the basic hypocrisy of liberal democracy, which indulged a radical
promise of equality while maintaining an essentially nonpolitical (nonbinary) process of decisionmaking (compromise) and commitment to unconstrained individual liberty. For Schmitt this
combination meant that private interest and private power would become the real bearers of
authority at the expense of the political. Of course, Schmitt, a Nazi supporter, did not aim to bring
about the realization of substantive social equality in Western democracies, although his work has
resonated with both left-progressive and authoritarian-conservative theorists. See Tracy B. Strong,
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Thomas Frank's recent cultural critique of "market democracy" can
be taken as an elucidation of the "plane of immanence" concept in the
ways it surfaces (and ridicules) the now pervasive faith that the market
can serve as a functional equivalent of a democratic political institution.55
Frank sees this faith, which is shared across the political and social spectrum, as confusing the economic notion of exchange with the political
notion of consent. Markets as "democratic" and populist institutions are
increasingly seen as being capable of bestowing political legitimacy in
the same way that popular democracy does.56 The problem of Empire, as
Hardt and Negri view it, is precisely that the new power networks pluralistically incorporate in their expansiveness all peoples, cultures and
societies without subjecting them to modern, territorialized forms of
domination and discrimination, but at the same time without democratically empowering the multitudes 7 it incorporates. Empire's plane of immanence may exude a certain populist cultural aura, as neoliberal markets do, but it frustrates democratic forms of social and political action.
The shift that Hardt and Negri identify, from transcendent (modem)
to Empire-based (postmodern) forms of power and authority, corresponds to, and even gives the appearance of suspending a set of conceptual paradoxes at the heart of liberal political theory. Rob Walker describes these basic paradoxes as they operate on two levels, one internal
and one external to the territorialized political unit of the nation-state.58
Internally, the paradox involves squaring liberal background normativities regarding individual freedom and equality (and the implicit theory of
the subject) with the sovereign imperative of submission to the single
authority of the state. Externally, the paradox pits the particularist primacy of the nation-state as sole legitimate political unit against the great
liberal authorizing myth of a single human community and the possibility
of universal peace and prosperity. 9 Walker identifies the tension between
these founding aspirations (individual freedom and equality, human
community and universal peace) and the virtually unquestioned legitiForeword: Dimensions of the New Debate Around Carl Schmitt, in CARL SCHMITT ix-xxvii, xxivxxvii supra note 8 (discussing Schmitt's revival among scholars from both ends of the political
spectrum).
55. See THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME CAPITALISM, MARKET
POPULISM AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 53-68 (2000).
56. Of course, this recent conflation of the market with the political must overcome a
longstanding trend in American social philosophy to view such privatization of the political with
skepticism. Dewey referred to such reduced notions of the political as merely "the shadow cast on
society by big business." See ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
440(1991).
57. Hardt and Negri use the term "multitude" to refer to the "new proletariat" that is both the
productive force that Empire harnesses to its productive and accumulatory needs, and the potential
subject of an anti-imperial (anti-Empire) political future. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 393413.
58. See Walker, supra note 8, at 36-49.
59. Id.
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macy of the sovereign nation-state, as the enabling paradox of liberal
political theory. The territorially contingent modem political imagination, evidenced in the boundedness of the nation-state, is closely tied to
the constraints of this liberal paradox.
Liberal theories of territorialized political authorization thus take
shape as a dual narrative: populist, democratic, humanist, on the one
hand, but sovereign, dominating and command/control-oriented on the
other. In other words, there are equal and opposite commitments to liberal freedom and sovereign order in the original liberal framing of political authority. Giorgio Agamben has described this duality in terms of a
philosophical dilemma at the heart of the modem theory of sovereignty
(and thus politics), whereby a pre-social state of nature, or "bare life," is
posited as the foundational condition behind the formation of the modem
political order. Sovereignty, A la Hobbes, is the political philosophical
settlement that brings together the subject of this bare life with its conceptual counterpart, political order. That which is sovereign, as Carl
Schmitt famously declared, decides upon the state of exception60; that is,
sovereignty is the power to decide upon the application of general rules
and the particular instances when those rules will not apply. Importantly,
Agamben equates the sovereign's declaration of the exception with a reimposition of bare life. When sovereigns declare exceptions, and thus reimpose conditions of bare life, the human lives thus affected cease to
enjoy the modem liberal political trappings of individual rights, freedom,
voice, etc., but nevertheless are still subject to the awesome power of the
state and its monopoly over organized violence.
Agamben's understanding of the current political crisis is that we
are experiencing a shift from the state of exception (and banishment to
the realm of bare life) as a temporal, and temporary category to a topo61
logical and permanent one. In Agamben's view, therefore, modem liberal political concepts such as sovereignty, nation, people, democracy,
and Rousseau's general will have nothing to do with the original meanings ascribed them.62 The break is catastrophic for those relegated to the
conditions of bare life under sovereign powers. "Contemporary politics is
this devastating experiment that disarticulates and empties institutions
and beliefs, ideologies and religions, identities and communities all

60. See CAPRL SCHMrrT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY (George Schwab trans., 1985) (1934).
61. Agamben writes: "The state of exception is thus not so much a spatiotemporal suspension
as a complex topological figure in which not only the exception and the rule but also the state of
nature and law, outside and inside, pass through one another. It is precisely this topological zone of
indistinction, which had to remain hidden from the eyes of justice, that we must tryto fix under our
gaze." AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 8, at 37. In this sense, Agamben defines the nomos of
modernity to be the (concentration, or refugee) camp. See id. at 166-180.
62. See AGAMBEN, MEANS WITouT END, supra note 8, at 110.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

throughout the planet,
so as then to rehash and reinstate their definitively
63
nullified form.,
Both Agamben and Hardt and Negri analyze postmodern forms of
power in terms of Foucault's notion of biopolitics. Foucault identified a
modem political shift toward what he termed governmentality, a form of
authority and power that relied on so-called apparatuses of security and
"biopolitics" (biopower). Both concepts convey a dispersed, nonMachiavellian, nonterritorial understanding of authority and power.64
Whereas early modem sovereign forms of power targeted territory and
sought direct means to control it while exercising the power of death
over subjects, postmodern biopolitics takes as its primary object, the
population and life itself, which are both non-territorialized constructs.
Politics is no longer about the ostensibly central categories that derive
from the founding modem story of sovereignty and citizens but rather
about life itself. To the extent that we are still focusing on the categories
of sovereignty and the political rights and capacities of citizens, we are
not even in a realm of the political that matters.61
Importantly, the great originators of liberal political theory (Hobbes,
Locke, Kant, Rousseau) all relied on now increasingly dubious accounts
of unified and autonomous individual subjects as the natural "building
blocks" of the political sphere.6 These highly problematic individual
subjects, in a supposedly natural state of perpetual freedom and violence,
find a more efficacious liberty under sovereign law and order.67 As
Walker shows, the modem theory of sovereignty and the territorialized
political dimension, which that theory prescribes, is irreducibly linked to
the positing of imaginary individual subjects. Together, the territorial and
subjectified premises of political life set the outer limits on what legiti63. Id.
64. See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECr 87-104 (Graham
Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
65. The creation of the category "citizen" is only possible through the original separation of
bare life from a political realm appurtenant to the erection of the sovereign. This splitting of human
life from political life was described by Karl Marx as the distinction between human and political
emancipation. See Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26, 35
(Robert Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1972).
66. To the extent that poststructural, critical race and feminist theories have displaced this
modern notion of subjects congealing in homogeneous communities, along with the ways in which
such subjects may be effectively "represented" in the organs of democratic government and thus in
the nation-state, the founding moment of legitimate liberal politics is destabilized.
67. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 147 (Francis B. Randall ed., Wash. Square Press 1964)
(1651).
68. However, Will Kymlicka argues that liberalism has, until recently, viewed national
minority (group-based) political demands with ambivalence, although he does not extend this
analysis to subnational (racial, gender, sexual) minorities. In the U.S. context his analysis would
apply to Puerto Ricans, Native Americans, Native Hawaiians and Native Alaskans. See Will
Kymlicka, Ethnicity in the USA, in The Ethnicity Reader 229-247 (Montserrat Guibernau & John
Rex eds., 1997).
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mate politics can look like. Transnational and/or group-based politics, for
example, are illegitimate forms ab initio.' External to the nation-state,
Walker identifies a limit concept in the humanist cosmopolis, which is
paradoxically both universalist and modem. This imaginary universal
community, which is integral to liberal framings of a utopian international sphere, also prefigures legitimate and illegitimate political subjects
and projects. Here, a range of "tribalist," premodern fundamentalist, and
anti-developmental
political projects would be categorically
illegitimate.6
Having read these postmodern accounts of the crisis, one comes
away with a sense that the conceptual veneer of Western liberal accounts
of the political are about to crack. Factoring in the changing material
capacities of communication technologies, and what these mean for the
cross-border transferability of capital, goods and know-how, the highly
territorialized story of authority becomes even harder to comprehend.
Also, as international lawyers are well aware, the various national legal
systems have long since become "transnational," with institutions from
the highly structured WTO to the more informal ISO, globalizing the
letter and practice of trade, property, and products law.7' Nevertheless,
the obstacles presented by the old conceptual frameworks remain with us
in important ways. Indeed, it is the political deployment of these frameworks that is most noticeable from a critical race perspective.
Responses to so-called politics of difference present a case in point.
In the form of a majority/minority problematic, the questions posed to
liberal political theory about how to handle "surplus" people excluded
from the category of "we the People"'" have been finessed in various
ways.72 In the United States and other settler societies, the problems were
handled by declaring that segments of the population fell outside "civilization" and, therefore, outside the political framework. They were either

69. In addition to the spatial dimension discussed here, Walker identifies a constraining
temporality in liberal political theory, through which all future alternatives have already been
mapped along developmental trajectories emanating from a modern present. See Walker, supra note
8, at 36-42.
70. ISO is the commonly used name for the International Organization for Standardization, the
"private" international organization responsible promulgating over 13,000 industrial standards
applicable in over 140 countries.
71. Agamben identifies this key ambiguity embedded in the term "people" as it is used in
liberal political theory: "It is as if what we call 'people' were in reality not a unitary subject but a
dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles: on the one hand, the set of the People as a whole
political body, and on the other, the subset of the people as a fragmentary multiplicity of needy and
excluded bodies ... of the wretched, the oppressed, and the defeated." AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER,
supra note 8, at 177.
72. See generally ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN
U.S. HISTORY (1997) (discussing the recent treatment of the problem of exclusionary definitions of
citizenship, interestingly, written by the co-author of a monograph arguing against standard
birthright citizenship).
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treated as de jure noncitizens (slaves, "savages," "[nonwhite] aliens ineligible for citizenship"), or they were relegated to a de facto secondclass citizenship status. Pursuing race-based politics in the post-Civil
Rights period has meant, however, responding to a different strategy of
exclusion, perhaps best captured in the charge of "balkanization" that has
been leveled at those who dare play the "race card" in American politics.
Here, the politics of difference is delegitimized through the old modem
political theoretical framework that does not view subnational (racial,
religious, sexuality-based, gender-based) communities as legitimate political units of obligation and action." Recently revised theories of pluralism (multiculturalism), designed to combat this deployment of liberal
theory, remain contained by the nation-state discourse, as liberal writers
from Taylor to Walzer illustrate.74 The traditional stories thus remain
powerful in their gate-keeping function. They continue to authorize
authorization.
Furthermore, the mutually reinforcing quality of the reciprocal
originary moments of liberal political philosophy identified by Agamben
(bare life, order under law) is most clear in the ways the constitutional,
constrained version of sovereignty, which in its liberal form is subject to
the types of universalist democratic commitments Schmitt distrusted, has
coexisted with an almost fascistic, "permanent state of exception" applied to racial minorities and other outsider groups. This basic tension,
manifest at liberal democracy's core, betrays the virtually constitutive
particularism behind these putatively universalist commitments. Given
liberalism's notable inability to eradicate race-based social disparities,
and indeed, its reliance on social and economic hierarchy in general, its
legitimacy hinges on a fundamentally compromised universalism. Cultural difference and "social pathology" (read together as racial difference) serve as boundaries delimiting the universal. 7' As Charles Mills has
argued, rather than a social contract at the heart of Western liberal notions of the political, we might, here, more accurately refer to it as a racial contract. 6 The notion of a racial contract captures the operation of

73. A particularly distasteful mutation of this nationalist elision of race has occurred in the
conservative response to the movement claiming reparations for slavery. Polemicists like David
Horowitz argue that slavery benefited "Americans," including Blacks. Horowitz's infamous "10
reasons" advertisement states that "[tlhe claim for reparations is premised on the false assumption
that only whites have benefited from slavery. If slave labor created wealth for Americans, then
obviously it has created wealth for black Americans as well, including the descendants of slaves."
David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why Reparationsfor Blacks is a Bad Idea for Blacks - and Racist
Too, David Horowitz's Notepad, at http://www.frontpagemag.com/horowitzsnotepad/2001/hnOl-0301.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2001). The inverse of this argument is that the harm of slavery was to
"America," since Blacks are a constituent part of that collective.
74. But see Kymlicka, supranote 68.
75. See Peter Fitzpatrick, Racism and the Innocence of Law, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 119,
120 (Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt eds., 1987).
76. See MILLS, supra note 34.
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the fundamental inclusion/exclusion dynamic always at work, historically the most socially relevant along racial lines, in the "egalitarian"
project of western liberal democracy." Whether this conception of
authority is based on more absolutist notions of the "national will" or is
constitutionally divided and limited seems almost beside the point from
an outsider perspective.
These highly theoretical framings of the political crisis, dense
though they may be, help shed greater light on the creative approaches to
politics contained in the work of engaged anti-colonial and critical race
scholars such as those discussed here. Working through different paths,
each of the theorists outlined above ends up in a similar prescriptive
place. Each insists that progressive politics must respond to the current
crisis by dispensing with the familiar conceptual and institutional apparatuses of subjectivity and sovereignty. The critical implications of this
body of theory involve potentially every aspect of our political imaginary, from divorcing ourselves from the modernist commitment to territorially bounded thinking, to giving up our postmodern fascination with
hybrid or border subjectivities."8 Let us now consider what may be gained
from reading the four articles analyzed above through the theory of
postmodern political crisis.
San Juan's defense of robust nationalist political struggle, together
with his refutation of postcolonial/poststructural theory, presents the
problem as one of identifying the proper anti-imperial political subject.
Properly defined collective subjectivities, though their positing may risk
gliding over important underlying social divisions, appear to San Juan as
indispensable means for combating the depoliticization of social hierarchization. The liberal fragmentation of political agency, aided in San
Juan's opinion by postcolonial/poststructural theory, presents a primary
barrier to progressive political mobilization. San Juan's defense of subaltern nationalism appears at first glance to champion a traditional sovereign form of power and contestation, and thus, to be out of step with the
theoretical reworkings of the political we have considered. However,
crucially, San Juan is at pains to divorce his defense of subaltern nationalism from the sovereign state form. This effective rejection of a politics

77. Agamben, following Jean Luc Nancy, refers to this contradictory logical operation at the
heart of liberal political theory as the "ban." The ban, which more accurately captures the originary
logic than does social contract, signifies the fact that the exception is the basic structure of
sovereignty, that sovereignty, and thus law, refer back to bare life and simultaneously exclude and
suspend it. The notion of a movement from bare life toward order under law (and occasionally back
to bare life under the state of exception), which social contract theory monumentalizes, "condemned
democracy to impotence every time it had to confront the problem of sovereign power and has also
rendered modem democracy constitutionally incapable of thinking a politics freed from the form of
state." AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 8, at 28-29, 58-59, 109.
78. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 138. "[W]hat if a new paradigm of power, a postmodern

sovereignty, has come to replace the modem paradigm and rule through differential hierarchies of
the hybrid and fragmentary subjectivities that [postmodern] theorists celebrate?" Id.
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of sovereignty is the primary distinction between a conception of the
nation as a political mechanism for protection against subordination,
Westernization, and global Empire, and that of the nation as an ideological tool for internal repression of difference. 9 San Juan's objection to the
separation of society from nation establishes a proximity between his
apparently modern conception of the subaltern nation and Hardt and
Negri' s postmodern multitude,' or the bare life of Agamben' s "people."'"
While San Juan's nation partakes of a familiar modern politics of militant resistance, it evinces a Fanonian refusal to re-inscribe a sovereign
(bio)politics of exclusion, or national totalitarianism.
San Juan's choice of national violence is important in that it implicitly targets a deep binary tension in liberal political theory, the bright-line
distinction between violence and law. For Agamben, sovereign power's
authority to decide between violence (the exception, bare life) and law
(the rule) masks a fundamental indifference between the two: "the sovereign is the point of indistinction between violence and the law, the
threshold on which violence passes over into law and law over into violence." 2 The sovereign's theoretical privileging follows from its having
been imbued with nature's permanent state of violence (the war of everyone against everyone, according to Hobbes 3), from which it can project order, law, social solidarity and the like. The hypocrisy of liberalism
is that it delegitimizes all forms of "violence" that threaten the constituted social order, and yet preserves as legitimate in its core political
essence the threat of an arbitrary constituting power over life and death.
San Juan and Agamben intersect in their recourse to Benjamin, who
exposed the link between violence and law." However, it appears that
San Juan and Agamben interpret Benjamin differently with regard to his
notion of "divine violence," which for San Juan grounds his defense of a
nationalist, political third-way beyond the dialectic of state violence and
law. 5 San Juan's work, which is supported in various ways by that of
Arif Dirlik, Benita Perry, Aijaz Ahmad, R. Kothari and Alex de Waal,
uses a postmodern appreciation of the shortfalls of modern liberalism to
79. Hardt and Negri argue that the "ambiguous progressive functions of the concept of
[subaltern] nation exist primarily when nation is not effectively linked to sovereignty, that is, when
the imagined nation does not (yet) exist ....As soon as the nation begins to form as a sovereign
state, its progressive functions all but vanish." HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at
80. See supra note 8.
81. See supra note 8.
82. AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 8, at 32.
83. HOBBES, supra note 67, at 87.
84. See AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER, supra note 8, at 63-67.
85. Agamben instead develops Benjamin's concept of "bare life"-for Agamben the link
Benjamin drew between sovereign violence and law. In Agamben's theory, therefore, bare life,
perhaps best understood as the anti-systemic subject of biopolitics, emerges in the emancipatory role
that San Juan ascribes to the nation as bearer of subaltern agency. See id. at 63-67, 187-88.
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redeem a modernist narrative of political authority as popular sovereignty. Violence tied to the nation, in this sense, should be understood as
a metaphor for a broader argument about the possibility of confrontational politics, a robust return to public forms of the political and a renewal of support for revolutionary struggle.
Kapur's work differs from San Juan's in positing the subaltern sex
worker as the proper progressive political subject. Neither the nation, nor
a similarly collective feminist subject (women) would represent superior
forms of agency for enacting Kapur' s notion of a politics of desire. However, Kapur's analysis of Indian sex work suggests even a further elaboration of the political space of desire. By emphasizing the heightened
autonomy sex workers acquire both as market actors and through their
related efforts to claim labor rights (including health and safety protections) and other civil rights such as the right of free movement, Kapur
moves toward a notion of the political that operationalizes the relative
openness of markets. 6 Echoing critical international legal scholar David
Kennedy's provocative call to activate the potential inherent in the ways
political power is deployed through the private actions and "regimes" of
the market, 7 Kapur provides concrete evidence that such efforts may
provide a useful vehicle for progressive politics. In this sense, Kapur's
argument is compatible with the call by Hardt and Negri to forge an antiimperial politics from Empire's own economic, social and cultural productive matrix and the openings in its capitalist plane of immanence.88
This possibility is inherent in Empire's new structuring of production to include all aspects of life, the very social and cultural relations of
the multitude. 9 As Hardt and Negri argue: "In the postmodernization of
the global economy, the creation of wealth tends ever more toward what
we will call biopolitical production, the production of social life itself, in
which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap
and invest one another." 9 One aspect of biopolitical production is the rise
in prominence of "affective labor." Affective labor refers to production
which occurs through corporeal means, but which results in immaterial
86. It is important to note that markets are relatively open, that is, especially in comparison to
more traditional social systems that blocked most forms of social or economic mobility. I would
certainly not make the argument for markets as the new populist hope, as made by many neoliberal
apologists. See generally, FRANK, supra note 55.
87. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 25 (arguing for a progressive rethinking of the political that
goes beyond an international institutional regime to countenance "all the forms of power and sites of
choice accompanying the international market.").
88. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
89. To grasp this concept, one might recall the hermit from Twain's Connecticut Yankee,
whose act of praying the Yankee modernizer, Hank Morgan, turns to the ends of production by
attaching ropes and pulleys to him in such a way as to harness the energy created as the hermit
performs his perpetual bowing motion. See MARK TwAIN, A CoNNECricuT YANKEE IN KING
ARTHUR'S COURT 280-81 (Webster 1890)(1889). See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 208-18
(discussing new forms of production).
90. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at xiii.
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"products." "What affective labor produces are social networks, forms of
community, biopower." 9' Kapur's research reveals the extent to which
subaltern sex workers indeed constitute alternative social networks and
forms of community, and her work raises the interesting possibility of
what Hardt and Negri refer to as "a kind of spontaneous and elementary
communism."' Immaterial forms of production (informational, communicational, affective) are radically decentralized,93 as opposed to the
paradigmatically centralized forms of factory production. In this decentralization lies a great capacity for resistance to the control of productive
processes. Kapur's work maps this inherently political capacity of subalterns in the sex work industry, whose mobility is the expression of disruptive potential. 94
The non-victim subject position of sex workers that Kapur seeks to
inscribe through her work bespeaks the type of postmodern political
identity that Agamben calls "whatever singularities." 95 Kapur asserts that
the emergence of the postcolonial sexual subaltern pursuing a politics of
desire not only exposes the limitations of the victim-subject, but also
combats the idea of the Indian woman as tied to the (conservative) figuration of the national culture and community. Agamben argues that
sovereign political domination can easily abide the assertion of any claim
for identity, so long as it is tied to a "representable condition of belonging."" "Whatever singularities" that form communities without a coherent sense of social identity are, for Agamben, the true bearers of postsovereign politics. Kapur shows how the social and political subjectivities readied for postcolonial sexual subalterns by reformist antitrafficking legal interventions, which Agamben's work would classify as
state-sanctioned and emptied of real content, cannot underwrite the politics of desire she favors.
Santiago's analysis of the determinants of Puerto Rican juridical
marginalization captures the nuanced workings of the political constitution of Empire as it relates to management of difference. This connection
becomes clear when one notes that the colonial encounter is constitutive
of Western political identity. 97 The Othering of putatively non-politically
evolved peoples helped set the outer limits of the properly political world
of Europe and its offshoots. The second important constitutive alterity of

91. Id. at 293.
92. Id. at 294. "Today productivity, wealth, and the creation of social surpluses take the form
of cooperative interactivity .... In the expression of its own creative energies, immaterial labor thus
seems to provide the potential for a kind of spontaneous and elementary communism." Id.
93. See id. at 294.
94. Hardt and Negri place heavy emphasis on "nomadism" or the voluntary mobility of the
multitude as a fundamental political activity under postmodern conditions of labor. See id. at 362-64.
95. AGAMBEN, MEANS WrTouT END, supra note 8, at 86-7.
96. Id. at 87.
97. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 103.
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political modernism, as discussed above, has involved internal Others
who were also denied political subjecthood. The case of Puerto Rico
presents an important bridge between these two types of identity-creating
constructions of difference. As Hardt and Negri observe, a new logic
governing difference and identity obtains under conditions of Empire.
Rather than a hierarchical relationship of dialectical opposition between
rigidly (biologically-defined) notions of identity and difference, as typical of strictly modern forms of dominance and exclusion, Empire instead
acknowledges the hybridity of identity and manages it.9s
Although Santiago does not specifically invoke the question of national self-determination for Puerto Rico, the concept is implicated in his
work. The juridical space that imperial lawmakers opened up for Puerto
Rico, which is a space literally neither here (imperial center) nor there
(colony), in effect frustrates the application of self-determination discourse, a modern international legal doctrine that extended the liberal
political settlement (sovereignty and statehood) to colonial peoples.
Practically every other peripheral space, i.e., throughout the colonies of
Asia, Africa and Oceania, warranted application of the "right" of selfdetermination. In this regard, however, Puerto Rico has remained truly
liminal to the international juridical order of the 20' century, being neither fully absorbed by, nor definitively liberated from, the imperial bond.
Santiago's (and Lazos Vargas's 99) work provides an important perspective for understanding the problem of self-determination as it applies
to Puerto Rico. If, as Santiago argues, the modem dialectic of (biologistic) racism did not determine the juridical status of Puerto Rico, this
might help shed light on the complexity behind debates about the "status
question," and why both sovereign and non-sovereign (or perhaps quasisovereign) forms of resistance have been an important part of antiimperial political agency there.' m In order to understand this connection,
the link must be drawn between modernist forms of racism and sovereignty. There are several ways of conceiving this link. Antony Anghie's
work has established a constitutive historical link between colonial racism and the evolution of modern sovereignty as an international legal
98. See Id. at 190-203. Hardt & Negri write:
Colonial racism, the racism of modem sovereignty, first pushes difference to the extreme
[Empire-based]
and then recuperates the Other as negative foundation of the Self ....
order, in contrast, has nothing to do with this dialectic. Imperial racism, or differential
racism, integrates others with its order and then orchestrates those differences in a system
of control.
Id. at 194-95.
99. Much of this particular analysis of Santiago's work could apply, mutatis mutandis, to
Lazos Vargas's. For the sake of brevity and breath of coverage, I will focus my comments regarding
Lazos Vargas's work on the epistemological questions it raises and the significance of those for
political theory. See infra text accompanying notes 114-131.
100. For a strong argument that the U.S. should grant Puerto Rico self-determination rights (in
the form of free elections) see Ediberto Roman, Empire Forgotten: The United States' Colonization
of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REv. 1119 (1997).
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concept.'01 Anghie persuasively argues that sovereignty doctrine is irreducibly racialized in the colonial encounter. With regard to the ontology
of sovereignty, one might consider the ways that Hobbes himself constructed his notion of Leviathan against what Fitzpatrick calls the
"specular repository" of America's "savages." °2 The concepts of both the
modem political subject and his (sic) sovereigns, beginning with Hobbes
and continuing up through Hegel, have been constructed through a racialized logic of projection and negation. First, an archetypal (albeit
counterfactual) disorder is projected onto the savage and primitive racial
Other and then that disorder is transcended in positing the politically
modem Western subject and his corollary, the sovereign.
The turn to later modem and postmodern forms of culturalist racial
differentiation' coincides with a turn away from modem political paradigms that were closely tied to biologistic forms of racism. As Santiago
suggests, Puerto Rico, in being subjected to this new form of racial differentiation, slips into a kind of differently territorialized political status,
characterized as a juridically constructed ambiguous "space." Given this
relatively deterritorialized form of neocolonial subjugation, and the
commensurately altered form of racialization it implies, the case of
Puerto Rico must be stretched to fit into modem, nation-based political
categories. Without presuming to assess the highly charged status
debate,'0 5 I would like to sketch a few consequences for understanding
Puerto Rican political struggle from the theoretical perspective suggested
by Santiago.
One of the problems with applying the principle of selfdetermination in the case of Puerto Rico has been defining the relevant
"self' who should be politically enfranchised. The question is complicated by at least two factors. First, it is estimated that seventy-five percent of all Puerto Ricans live in the United States.' 3 Second, residents of
Puerto Rico include non-Puerto Ricans, many of whom are economically
powerful due to the tax incentives Congress has provided for U.S. busi101. See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries:Sovereignty and Colonialismin NineteenthCentury InternationalLaw, 40 HARv.INT'L L.J. 1 (1999)
102. See PETER FrrZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 76 (1992).
103. See Id at 63-91.
104. See supra text accompanying note 38.
105. For different perspectives on the status debate, all of which suggest the complexity of the
questions raised, see generally Pedro A. Malavet, PuertoRico: CulturalNation, American Colony, 6
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2000) (arguing that Puerto Rican cultural nationhood be recognized by the
United States, perhaps as a prelude to nonassimilationist statehood, or association); Usa Napoli, The
Legal Recognition of the National Identity of a Colonized People: The Case of PuertoRico, 18 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 159 (1998) (arguing that a plebiscite be held regarding status and that Puerto
Ricans living in the United States be allowed to participate); for a book length treatment by one of
the architects of the current Commonwealth status, see generally JOSE TRIAS MONGE, PUERTO Rico:
THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD (1997).
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nesses which locate there.'" In a strictly territorialized application of selfdetermination, the result would be an unacceptable (and neo-colonial)
under- and over-inclusiveness that would inscribe within the definition of
the politically relevant "self' the very conditions of colonial dependence
(economic diaspora and corporate imperialism). Expanding on the perspective derived from Santiago's work, we can draw different lines
around the concept of self-determination.
Redrawing the lines around the modem principle of selfdetermination can also prove supportive of the types of coalitional struggle that have arisen recently around the question of sovereignty in Vieques.'09 Paradoxically, the protests over territorial control of Vieques by
U.S.-based Puerto Ricans and prominent African Americans suggest a
non-territorialized conception of the political. The Vieques protests have
increasingly taken on transnational significance as they site not only the
local political agency of Vieques Islanders who seek control of their immediate environment, but also the aspirations of Puerto Ricans in New
York City who seek to elect the first Puerto Rican mayor in coalition
with African Americans.0 9
Indeed, Santiago's point about expanding race-critical paradigms
with an appreciation of Puerto Rico's ambiguous juridical space might
also be useful in understanding how race itself in Puerto Rico underwent
a significant transformation from the period of Spanish rule to that of
U.S. colonialism."0 As Angel Oquendo has argued, the White-over-Black
racial dualism of the United States has been displaced in Puerto Rico by
a "single Afro-Antillean ethos."' This apparently homogeneous (modem) construct is, importantly, articulated as an ethos and not a nation. It
is a notion that resonates with the non-identitarian "identities" called for
by Hardt and Negri, and Agamben."' Santiago's expansion of the race
framework may go a long way toward explaining the highly racialized
status of Puerto Ricans living in the United States, ' 3 and the differently
structured "ethos" on the island. Ultimately, by building on Santiago's
work, we may be able to develop a political model that would work both

107. See Roman, supra note 100, at 1192-93 & n.354 (1997).
108.
For one columnist's assessment of the coalitional aspect of the Vieques protests, see
Salim Muwakkil, The Division Potential; Blacks need to Form Political Coalition with Hispanics,
CHI.TRIB., July 2, 2001, at 13.
109.
See Adam Nagourney, Group Seeks Black-Latino Joint Effort For Mayor, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 11, 2001, at B 1.
110. See Angel R. Oquendo, Re-Imagining The LarinolA Race, 12 HARv. BLACKLETTER J. 93,
100-02 (1995).
111.
Id. at 101.
112. See also ARLENE M. DAVILA, SPONSORED IDENTITIES: CULTURAL POLITICS INPUERTO
Rico 21 (1997) (arguing for a postnational analysis of cultural politics).
113.
See Kevin Johnson, Puerto Rico, Puerto Ricans, and LatCrit Theory: Commonalities and
Differences Between Latina/o Experiences, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 107, 121-23 (2000) (discussing
the racialized status of Black Puerto Ricans in the United States).
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the juridical liminality and racial hierarchy negatively affecting Puerto
Ricans into a vision of political contestation in a reconstructed (transnational? post-sovereign? race-global?) political space.
Finally, I would argue that Lazos Vargas's reflection on the need for
a pragmatist commitment in outsider legal scholarship works through
some of the epistemological aspects of the political crisis by problematizing the specific antinomies inherent in pursuing anti-foundationalist,
critical scholarly agendas. The theoretical link between epistemology and
sovereignty that explicates this dimension of Lazos Vargas' s work can be
understood through Walker's discussion of the parallels between sovereignty-based stories of authorization and current (IR) disciplinary practices that constrain knowledge production. Pointing out a bitter irony for
critical IR theorists, Walker writes:
The primary difficulty posed by [mainstream IR] rhetorics of structural/natural necessity and empirical knowledge is that they are
claims to authority of precisely the same kind as the claims to authority that constitute modem forms of politics. Hobbes, for example, not
only worked out a paradigmatic account of what is involved in constructing a modem politics out of determinately free and equal individuals; he also did so on the basis of the kinds of philosophical categories involving dualisms of language and world, man and nature,
perceiver and perceived and the rest that still find their more elaborate
parallels in various debates about the epistemology of scientific inquiry. Much of contemporary scholarly debate about how one should
study politics resembles nothing so much as a parody of Schmittean
sovereigns struggling to decide the limits of what is scholarly, scientific, rational,
or professional and what is exceptional or even patho4
logical."
Not only can one point to these formal similarities between sovereign
political authorizations and the border policing function of disciplinary
epistemology, but, again, one may note the conceptual link between
Hobbes' positing of a particular kind of rational subject and his political
theory of sovereignty.
Hardt and Negri, in a book that predates the working out of their
theory of Empire, show how the liberal communitarian subject implicitly
reinscribes the state form. The key to their argument, paralleling that of
Walker, lies in seeing how the communitarian logic fails to dispense with
the notion of rational, though reflective/situated subject."' The community of these subjectivities that matters, i.e., the community that most
coherently comprises these rational-situated subjectivities, must be embodied in the state form. Other groupings will remain only partial com114.

Walker, supra note 8, at 13.
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ANTONIo NEGRI & MICHAEL HARDT, LABOR OF DIONYsus 256-57 (1994) (discussed in

SAN JUAN, supra note 13, at 138).
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munities since they cannot claim the state form. "In the final instance, the
communitarian preoccupation with the theory of the subject leads to the
of the State as the only fully realized and autonomous subproposition
' 6
ject.""
To the extent that pragmatism forces a critical engagement with the
Hobbesian (and communitarian) subject, it may also serve to destabilize
the conceptual paradigms of political modernity." 7 In this sense, for example, the pragmatist method" 8 offers a process for moving toward
resolution of a central political antinomy of modernity-identified by
Agamben as the split between "the People" and the people" 9-by offering dissident and outsider voices a place in the communal conversation
about truth and knowledge, if not a guarantee that their justice concerns
will be met through such coming to voice. Under pragmatist rules of the
game, the participants must avow the partial, particular and situated nature of their truth and justice claims,' 20 i.e., are foreclosed from propounding their "particular idea as an absolute." They may not claim their
positions as representative of either the People as sovereign Self, or of
the authentic national-popular "concrete universal" of an oppressed
group. Rather, the participants would agree in advance to an openness, a
resistance to premature closures and suturings of knowledge and truth
claims. In this way pragmatism potentially disarms the potent publicprivate split of traditional liberalism-put in crisis by the recent multicultural, pluralist turn-which has tended to elevate particular and situated (private) notions of the good to (public) universals.'
Some caveats would apply, of course. In one sense, calling for
scholarly self-reflection (acknowledgment of the critical scholar's own
positionality) does not automatically provide conceptual purchase on an
116. See Id. at 257.
Mari Matsuda sees value in pragmatism as a method (not per se as a normative
117.
commitment unto itself) because it "recognizes multiple consciousness, experimentation and
flexibility as tools of inquiry." Mari J. Matsuda, PragmatismModified and the False Consciousness
Problem, 63 S. CAL. L REV. 1763, 1764 (1990) [hereinafter Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified].
"Multiple consciousness" is the term Matsuda uses to refer to her re-thinking of the unitary modem
political subject from the perspective of the various axes of identity and subjugation--especially
race, gender and class. See Mar J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
JurisprudentialMethod, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7-10 (1989).
Following Matsuda, I want to insist that we understand pragmatism's strengths (as a
118.
method), but also see the necessity of augmenting it with some normative first principles. See infra
notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 71.
120.
See DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF
MEANING 221 (1993). Goldberg develops a pragmatic approach to race in the last chapter of the
book that provides helpful distinctions between a liberal and anti-racist pragmatism. See id. at 20637.
See Stuart Hall, Conclusion: The Multicultural Question, in UNSETTLED
121.
MULTIcuLTuRALISMS: DIASPORAS, ENTAGLEMENTS, TRANSRUPTIONS 230 (Bamor Hesse ed., 2000)
(discussing the ways the multicultural question has revealed the incoherence of the public-private
distinction).
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emerging, post-sovereign political space. Indeed, such a call could even
be seen as reinforcing the venerable liberal firewall erected between
politics and knowledge, even as it insists on the socially positioned quality of all knowledge creation. 2 Certain (conservative) appropriations of
pragmatism may even offer a way around the anti-disciplinary consequences of the positionality thesis, originally a critical ethnographic concept 23' that, as it "traveled" across disciplines, destabilized hegemonic
claims to disinterested and transparent knowledge production.'A Richard Rorty's neopragmatist manifesto itself illustrates, pragmatism can
further a naive individualism nearly devoid of structural analysis.' The
pragmatist can recognize other perspectives, relativize her own, but in
the last instance retain a troubling coherence or foundation in the form of
an inertial acceptance of the status quo order.'2
I would argue that a strong normative commitment-something like
Mari Matsuda's notion of a "weighted pragmatism,"' 27 Cornel West's
"prophetic pragmatism,"' 12 David Theo Goldberg's "anti-racist pragmatism,'" 2 9 or Daria Roithmayr's "radical pragratism""°-is necessary to
avoid the liberal trap-door in pragmatism's non-foundation. It certainly
seems appropriate from the perspective of postmodern progressive political theory to simply declare that we (Critical Race Theorists, LatCritters,
etc.) are part of different epistemological tribes from the Posners, and
Farber/Sherry's of the world who challenge crits' deployments of history
122.
Farber and Sherry's quasi-pragmatist polemic against "radical multiculturalism" is a case
in point. For example, Farber and Sherry ask rhetorically, "[w~hat should we seek and what should
we speak if not the truth? The unhappy answers are politics, and political power." DANIEL FARBER
& SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW
102(1997).
123.
Social anthropologists sometimes use the term "positioned subject." See RENATO
ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 7 (1989). See generally
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-30 (1974).
124.
For a discussion of Farber and Sherry's "conservative pragmatism," juxtaposed to a
proposed "radical pragmatism," see Daria Roithmayr, Guerrillas in Our Midst: The Assault on
Radicals in American Law, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1658 (1998) (reviewing Farber and Sherry).
125.
See RORTY, supra note 7, at xv (1989) (tracing a pragmatist project through the
individualized figure of the "liberal ironist"). But see Allan Hutchinson, The Three 'Rs':
Reading/Rorty/Radically, 103 HARV. L. REV. 555 (1989) ("Rorty's passionate account of cruelty and
humiliation as 'the worst thing we do' places too much emphasis on individuals and too little on
structural arrangements.") Id. at 564.
126.
San Juan critiques this tendency of pragmatism toward status quo maintenance in his
book. See SAN JUAN supra note 13, at 70.
127.
See Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified supra note 117, at 1764-69 (1990) (arguing for a
pragmatism that gives special consideration to the perspectives of subordinated groups and that is
committed to anti-subordination).
128.
See generally MARK DAVID WOOD, CORNEL WEST AND THE POLITICS OF PROPHETIC
PRAGMATISM (2000).
129.
See GOLDBERG, supra note 120, at 214-237 (arguing for a racial pragmatism that
proactively resists racism).
130.
See Roithmayr, supra note 124, at 1678-84 (arguing for a pragmatism that is purposive
and politically instrumental to outsider interests).
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and narrative.' My argument is that a commitment to pragmatist antiabsolutism works differently for outsiders than it does for the mainstream. Whether they reflect a simple bad faith will to power (possible),
or the workings of more complex structural and systemic racism and
elitism (likely), I do not experience the mainstream attacks on critical
race projects as invitations to a pragmatist talking circle. They are designed to disqualify outsider voices, and indeed, to roll back policies that
have only recently brought outsiders into the academy.
CONCLUSION

The question the critical race project might ask of post-sovereignty
politics is: how does one do your politics. As someone who is intellectually disposed to post-sovereignty theory, I always find myself flipping
through the texts to gather the fragments of evidence about what that
politics looks like. I'm aware that critical race advocates, many of whom
hold praxis dear, will want to know what they should be doing politically
to avoided the dangers of sovereign ontology. The answer to the question
is, unfortunately, not so straightforward as far as I can tell. Indeed, to
someone who commits time and energy to political struggle, in the conventional meaning of the term, the politics of de-subjectification, deterritorializaiton and de-sovereigntization probably do not feel like real
politics at all. They do not feel like truth being spoken to power, and they
do not feel like power being checked or wealth redistributed. I agree with
San Juan's point about the false premise of means-ends logic as it is applied by post-isms of various kinds, 3 2 but I also think that those involved
in anti-systemic political struggle might easily apply their own basic
means-ends analysis in concluding that the celebrated transgressions of
postmodernity (hybridity, mobility, diasporas, indeterminacy, etc.) are
may even appear as
not emancipatory. Indeed, these "transgressions"
33
means toward continued subordinations.
For progressive postmodern political theory to speak to movement
actors, it obviously must remain engaged with them. To an extent, this
analytical essay has attempted to model a dialogical method for letting
postmodern theory inform engaged research. The LatCrit and Critical
Race project to which the four articles discussed here contribute is pre131.
I take the term "epistemological tribes" from S. Sayyid. Beyond Westphalia: Nations and
Diasporas--the Case of the Muslim Umma, in UNSEMrLED MULTICULTURALISMS: DIASPORAS,
ENTAGLEMENTS, TRANSRUPTIONS 50 n.8 (Barnor Hesse ed., 2000). Lazos Vargas, too, suggests that
these epistemological differences are on the order of an "irresolvable paradigm gap," but would
counsel "engagement" between the different perspectives.
132. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
133. See HARDT AND NEGRI, supra note 8, at 150. "Simplifying a great deal, one could argue
that postmodemist discourses appeal primarily to the winners in the processes of globalization ....
In other words, the current global tendencies toward increased mobility, indeterminacy, and
hybridity are experienced by some as a kind of liberation but by others as an exacerbation of their
suffering." Id.
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cisely the kind of "local" political project (albeit in the realm of research
and scholarship) that postmodern political theory should address. An
instructive example of how to understand post-sovereignty (postnational) politics under conditions of globalization is S. Sayyid's elaboration of the postmodern notion of diaspora in the context of Umma-the
Muslim community of believers that may well constitute an actual postsovereign political presence. Sayyid writes:
The idea of the Muslim Umma is an attempt to come to terms with
the limits and the crisis of the nation-state. As forces and developments associated with globalization have weakened the institutional
rigidity of the Westphalian state, cracks and gaps begin to appear in
the international state system that provided the terrain for politics.
Given the mobile and constructed nature of social identities, these fissures within dominant institutional forms of the nation-state have allowed different kinds of collectives to be articulated, taking advantages of these gaps. These formations seep through the Westphalian
edifice, creating political formations that are neither in nor out of the
nation-state, but that have an undecidable relationship to it. In this
34
sense, diaspora is the name of this undecidable political formation.'
In this quote we see Sayyid effectively navigating the choppy analytical waters between identity and anti-essentialism, culture and politics,
the local and the global, and importantly, the modem and the postmoder. Diaspora, in Sayyid's hands, is neither an empirical claim (communities are living outside their national homes), nor a normative commitment (celebration of hybrid identity forms), but rather a political theoretical device for understanding the relationship between and among the
actual and potential transnational Muslim "movement," exploitative systems of globalization, and the existing political containers of nations and
states. Sayyid's postmodem political framework for understanding the
Umma is superior because it avoids the "pathos" in notions of diaspora
that fail to problematize the "unevenness by which nations are transformed into diasporas"' 3 -there are winners and losers in the process
and a political theory of diaspora must speak to the political consequences of those outcomes.
Is progressive postmodern political theory correct in assessing the
current crisis of the political and concluding that we are living in a postsovereign world? The answer is undoubtedly to be sought by studying
the real political formations, successes, and failures of globalization's
multitudes.
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Id. at 43.

